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Abstract
Introduction: General aviation largely comprises fixed-wing piston-engine light aircraft (,12,500 lbs). Unfortunately, this civil aviation
sector suffers a vastly inferior safety record when compared with air carriers (60- to 80-fold higher accident rate). Additionally, such
mishaps pose a considerable financial burden to both the affected family and the United States: US$1.64–4.64 billion annually. We
hypothesize that this safety disparity partly reflects more stringent operational regulations for air carriers. Herein, we determined whether
compliance with six selected air carrier regulations could potentially reduce general aviation accidents in degraded visibility (IMC) the
majority of which are fatal. Methods: Accidents (2005–2019) were identified from the National Transportation Safety Board Access
database. Fleet data for rate calculations were per the general aviation survey and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Statistics used
Poisson distributions. Results: Of 219 general aviation accidents in IMC, 43 (20%) could potentially have been averted had one, or more,
of the selected air carrier regulations been complied with. The largest percentage (62%) of the 43 mishaps were due to pilots operating
contrary to the air carrier regulation specifying takeoff or landing weather minimums. The second largest group related to more
conservative weather minimums required for an inexperienced airline pilot-in-command, eschewed in 19% of preventable general aviation
IMC mishaps. Conclusions: Alignment with the aforementioned air carrier operational rules could potentially blunt the IMC accident rate
(by 20%) for general aviation. Practical Applications: Adherence to the aforementioned air carrier regulations should be advocated to
general aviation pilots operating in IMC.
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Introduction
Statement of the Problem/Prior Work
General aviation largely comprises fixed-wing, piston-engine-powered light aircraft (,12,500 lbs) (Boyd, 2017) and
(in the USA) operate in accordance with a set of federal regulations encapsulated in the Code of Federal Regulations
(14CFR91) (Electronic Code of Federal Regulation, 2015a). Unfortunately, this segment of civil aviation suffers a vastly
inferior safety record when compared with air carriers (also referred to as airlines). Indeed, published research has
documented a 60- to 80-fold all-weather higher accident rate for general aviation compared with air carriers over the
1984–2017 period (Boyd, 2017; Li & Baker, 2007). It is also noteworthy that general aviation accidents pose a considerable
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financial burden to both the affected family and the United
States: estimated at US$1.64–4.64 billion annually in terms
of medical outlays, aircraft/property damage, and investigative costs (Sobieralski, 2013).
Why the disparity in aviation safety between general aviation and air carriers? Several reasons likely contribute.
First, the regulations governing air carrier operations
articulated in 14CFR121 (Electronic Code of Federal
Regulation, 2017c) are considerably more stringent than
the corresponding rules for general aviation promulgated in
14CFR91 (Electronic Code of Federal Regulation, 2015a).
By way of examples, weather minima dictate whether an
air carrier airplane is allowed to undertake an approach
(to land) or depart per 14CFR121.613 (Electronic Code of
Federal Regulation, 2017c) whereas no such rules limit
general aviation. Additionally, weather minima are raised
for airline pilots-in-command with less than 100 flight
hours in a particular airplane type. Also, air carrier pilots,
upon completion of their crew training, are required to fly
under the oversight of a ‘‘check airman’’ (Electronic Code
of Federal Regulation, 2017c) (referred to as ‘‘initial
operating experience’’) for a specified period of time. Of
course, a plethora of other reasons also likely contribute to
the superior safety evident for air carriers, e.g., (i) more
demanding training and recurrency for airline pilots
(Electronic Code of Federal Regulation, 2015c), (ii)
redundancy of equipment systems mandated for transport
category (i.e., passenger) airplanes (Electronic Code of
Federal Regulation, 2017b) but, for the most part, lacking
in light aircraft (Electronic Code of Federal Regulation,
2017a), and (iii) a greater pilot flying frequency and instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) encounters.
Study Objective
Considering the stellar safety record evident for air
carriers (Boyd, 2017), the objective of this retrospective
study was to determine whether compliance with a subset
of the more stringent operational regulations (14CFR121)
could potentially blunt the general aviation accident rate in
degraded visibility (herein also referred to as IMC and
operationally defined as a cloud ceiling of ,1,000 ft above
ground and/or forward visibility of ,1 statute mile).
Accidents in such adverse conditions were selected since
the risk of a general aviation fatal outcome increases over
sixfold (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007; Li & Baker, 1999).
Methods
Identification of Accidents
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
Access accident database was downloaded (NTSB, 2021)
and queried for piston-powered airplane accidents (2005–
2019) in IMC across the 48 contiguous US states.

Accidents were restricted to those involving instrumentrated private or commercial pilots operating in accordance
with 14CFR91 regulations for the purpose of personal or
business missions. It should be noted that commercial
pilots are occupationally distinct from airline transport
pilots. While the former may exercise their flying privileges
in revenue-generating enterprises (e.g., flight training,
charter flights), nevertheless they are prohibited from
acting as a crewmember for an air carrier (Electronic Code
of Federal Regulation, 2015a). In a separate query, a search
for scheduled air carrier accidents in IMC while operating
under 14CFR121 over the corresponding period was performed. Scheduled air carrier mishaps in which a passenger/
flight attendant was injured by turbulence in the absence
of airplane damage were omitted. General aviation flight
histories, official weather forecasts, demographics, and
injury severity were all per the NTSB database.
Airplane fleet times per the general aviation survey
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2021b) and the Bureau
of Transportation Statistics (2021) were used as denominators to determine accident rates for general aviation and
air carrier operations respectively. Fleet time for the former
was restricted to fixed-wing piston aircraft operations conducted for personal or business missions. For air carriers,
fleet times used were those for scheduled domestic passenger operations only.
Air Carrier Operational Regulations Evaluated
Six air carrier operational rules (14CFR121) (Electronic
Code of Federal Regulation, 2017c), which do not have to
be legally complied with by pilots operating under general
aviation regulations (14CFR91) (Electronic Code of Federal
Regulation, 2015a), were selected for this retrospective
study:
1. 14CFR121.651 describes departure and arrival
weather (forward visibility) minimums which must
be met for airline aircraft to take off or to perform an
instrument approach (to land). For departure flights,
since weather minima are approved on an air carrier
case-by-case basis by the Federal Aviation Administration, we opted to use the lowest minimum forward visibility specified in the instrument approach
procedure (Federal Aviation Administration, 2020)
for that airport from which a departure was undertaken by the general aviation accident airplane.
2. 14CFR121.613 disallows aircraft from departing if
the forecast flight visibility at the intended destination airport(s) at the estimated time of arrival is below
specified minima.
3. Transition (14CFR121.419) and difference (121.418)
training are mandatory for airline pilots prior to operating another make–model airplane (for which he/she
has no prior logged flight time) or a more recent
iteration of the same aircraft (e.g., 737-400 to 737-500)
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respectively. Comparable general aviation examples
would be a pilot seeking to fly a Piper PA-32 with no
prior experience in this make–model aircraft (transition
training) or seeking to operate a Cessna 172SP having
logged flight time in a Cessna 172N (difference
training). Operationally, we also defined an avionics
upgrade in the ‘‘difference training’’ category.
4. For a pilot-in-command (in common vernacular also
referred to as captain) with less than 100 hours accrued
flight time in airplane make–model to perform an instrument approach (to land) in IMC, the current airport
vertical visibility must be no less than the sum of the
minimum specified in the charted instrument approach
procedure (Federal Aviation Administration, 2020) plus
an additional 100 feet. Similarly, the required forward
visibility for such a pilot-in-command represents the sum
of that specified in the charted instrument approach
procedure (Federal Aviation Administration, 2020) plus
an additional K mile (14CFR121.652). Considering that
light aircraft are almost invariably certificated (Electronic
Code of Federal Regulation, 2017a) for single-pilot
operations, the pilot, by definition, assumes the role of
pilot-in-command. Hence in the context of the current
project, this regulation was applied to any general
aviation mishap involving a solo pilot who had accrued
less than the aforementioned 100 hours in the accident
aircraft make–model.
5. Following completion of their training to serve as a
crewmember of a particular airplane make–model, a
pilot must fly under the supervision of a ‘‘checkpilot’’ for a pre-determined period of time—15 hours
for piston-engine airplanes (14CFR121.434). In the
context of the current study, a check-pilot was defined as any second pilot occupying a crew position
and with an excess of the aforementioned 15 hours in
the corresponding airplane make–model.
6. Lastly, flight time limitations applicable to air carriers
(14CFR121.481) specify a maximum of 8 flight
hours per any 24 consecutive hours. For the current
study, flight time also included any time in which the
pilot was engaged in his/her professional occupation
immediately preceding the accident flight.
The aforementioned regulations were evaluated in the
context of whether IMC accidents (2005–2019) involving instrument-rated private/commercial pilots operating
piston-engine light aircraft under the auspices of general
aviation rules (14CFR91) could potentially have been averted
had the more stringent air carrier regime been followed.
Statistics
Changes in accident rates over the 2005–2019 period
were tested for statistical significance using a Poisson
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distribution (Dobson & Barnett, 2008) using the natural log
of fleet times. All statistics were performed with SPSS v26
(IBM Corp., Armonk, NY).
Non-Human Subject Research
This study was not considered human subject research
by virtue of all data used in the current investigation being
in the public domain. Accordingly, the research was
exempt from IRB review.
Results
Unabated General Aviation IMC Accident Rates
Since over the past two decades general aviation safety,
as an aggregate, has improved (AOPA Air Safety Institute,
2019), we first determined whether a parallel trend was
evident for IMC (cloud ceiling ,1,000 ft above ground)
operations over the 15 years of the current study. While the
IMC accident rate (Figure 1) diminished (p 5 0.004) from
2.2 to 1.4 (per million flight hours) initially, (2010–2014),
this decrease was not sustained with an increased IMC
accident rate (to 1.8 mishaps per million hours) evident
thereafter (2015–2019). In fact, this most recent IMC
accident rate was statistically unchanged (p 5 0.177)
relative to the initial period (2005–2009). The differential
in general aviation IMC accident rates compared with that
evident for air carriers (Figure 1) was also noteworthy
(varying between 32-fold and infinity). These findings
clearly demonstrate that general aviation operations in IMC
continue to represent a safety challenge.

Figure 1. General aviation IMC accident rate in degraded visibility
(2005–2019). Accident rates (in IMC) are shown for both air carriers and
general aviation (involving IFR-rated private/commercial pilots) operating
under airline (14CFR121) or general aviation (14CFR91) operational
regulations respectively. The accident count is n. A Poisson distribution
(using the natural log of fleet times) was employed to determine if
differences in the general aviation accident rates were statistically
significant relative to the initial period (2005–2009); *p 5 0.004.
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Are General Aviation Accidents in Degraded Visibility
Preventable by Adherence to Air Carrier Regulations?
A Retrospective Study
NTSB reports for a total of 219 IMC accidents occurring
over the 15 years (2005–2019) (excluding those involving
taxying or stationary aircraft) involving IFR-rated private/
commercial pilots (the IFR rating provides the pilot with
the necessary skills to fly the aircraft in the absence of
external visual cues) operating under general aviation
regulations (14CFR91) were manually inspected. Of these,
we identified 43 (19.6%) which could potentially have been
averted had one, or more, of the six selected air carrier
(14CFR121) regulations, examined herein, been complied
with. Below, in this retrospective study, we review accidents
grouped according to each of the six 14CFR121 regulations.
Interestingly, of the 43 IMC mishaps cited above, by far
the most (61.9%) were related to operations at variance
with the air carrier (14CFR121.65) regulation specifying
takeoff or landing weather minima (Figure 2). In degraded
visibility, these weather minima must be met for airline
aircraft to take off or to perform an instrument approach (to
land). Thus, while not a breach of 14CFR91 regulations
pertinent to the general aviation IFR-rated private/commercial pilots operating in IMC, 26 of these IMC mishaps could
have been precluded had this air carrier regulation been
subscribed to (Figure 2). We next determined whether this
subset of IMC accidents was biased in favor of departure or
approach mishaps. However, such crashes partitioned almost
equally between those in which departure (42.3%) and
approach (57.7%) minimums were discordant with those
specified per 14CFR121.65 (Figure 3).
The high-minimums pilot-in-command (14CFR121.652)
group represented the second largest group of IMC accidents which could have been averted. This air carrier
regulation stipulates that an airline pilot with less than 100
hours as pilot-in-command (‘‘captain’’ in layman’s parlance)
in a specific aircraft make–model must satisfy more stringent
vertical and forward visibility weather conditions in context
of landing in diminished visibility. Specifically, the cloud
ceiling at the arrival airport must be 100 ft higher and
forward visibility half a mile greater than that stated in the
instrument approach chart for the intended landing runway.
Had this regulation been applied by the IFR-rated private/
commercial pilots, potentially, 19% of the IMC accidents (of
the total mishap cohort in which 14CFR121 rules were not
observed) could have been prevented (Figure 2).
After completion of training, air carrier regulations
dictate that the pilot flies under the supervision of a
‘‘check-airman’’ for a specified period of time (15 hours for
an airplane with a reciprocating engine) referred to as initial
operating experience (14CFR121.434). For a general aviation equivalency, we operationally deemed IMC accidents
as not in concordance with this regulation if (a) the flying
pilot had less than the requisite 15 hours in aircraft make–

Figure 2. General aviation IMC accidents—grouping by nonadherence to
air carrier (14CFR121) regulations. IMC mishaps were grouped by the air
carrier regulation(s) (121.xxx) which, had it been complied with, could
have averted the general aviation accident. Data are expressed as a
percentage of the sum (n 5 43) of all accidents noncompliant with the air
carrier rules. Note that a particular mishap may have been at variance with
multiple 14CFR121 regulations; accordingly, the summed count for each
category exceeds n 5 43; n, accident count; Fcst, forecast.

model and (b) a second pilot with at least that experience
level (make–model) was absent. Of the 43 aforementioned
accidents, 9% (Figure 2) were associated with practices
contradictory to this 14CFR121 regulation.
Maximum flight time limits, articulated in 14CFR12
1.48, restrict airline pilots to a maximum of 8 in any 24
consecutive hours. In contrast no such comparable rule
applies to IFR-rated private/commercial pilots operating
under general aviation (14CFR91) regulations. In the context of the current study, any accident in which the NTSB
stated that the involved pilot was engaged in his/her
professional occupation prior to undertaking the accident
flight such that in combination with his/her flight time the
aforementioned 8 hours were exceeded was regarded as
breach of this regulation. This 14CFR121 category of
mishaps represented 9% of the accident cohort (Figure 2)
deemed as incompatible with air carrier regulations.
On the other hand, two other air carrier regulations were
infrequently implicated in IMC accidents involving
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Flight History/Demographics of Pilots Involved in General
Aviation IMC Accidents (2005–2019)
Towards determining if the aforementioned IMC accidents were biased towards inexperienced pilots, flight
histories for the general aviation accident pilots were
compiled. However, we saw little evidence favoring this
contention. Thus, the IFR-rated private/commercial pilots
involved in the general aviation IMC accident cohort had
accrued a median total flight (all aircraft) and actual IMC
times of 1,357 and 77 hours respectively (Table 1). This
level of total flight experience well exceeded that required
for initial commercial/IFR certification (250 hours)
(Electronic Code of Federal Regulation, 2020) and that of
a random sample of general aviation aviators (600 hours)
(Urban, 1984).
Discussion

Figure 3. Subcategorization of departure/approach IMC accidents contrary
to 14CFR121.651. IMC accidents which were noncompliant with the air
carrier regulation specifying weather minimum for departures and
approaches were segregated into the two corresponding groups. For each
group, data are expressed as a percentage of the total (n 5 26) of the
accident count for which 14CFR121.651 was in noncompliance.

IFR-rated private/commercial pilots operating under general
aviation regulations (14CFR91). Transition (14CFR121.419)
and difference (121.418) training are required for airline
pilots moving to another make and/or model airplane or to a more recent iteration of the same aircraft
make–model respectively. Herein, and considering the
increasing retrofitting of older general aviation aircraft with
more updated avionics (including electronic flight displays)
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2021b), we operationally
included such upgrades as requiring ‘‘difference training.’’
However, only 2 of 43 IMC accidents (in which the
14CFR121 rule(s) were not complied with) could have been
precluded had this regulation been adhered to. In one of
these two accidents new avionics had been installed in the
airplane less than one week prior to the accident flight. Similarly, the release/dispatch of air carrier aircraft is prohibited
unless the forecasted weather at the planned destination
is above minima (14CFR121.613). However, again, IMC
accidents due to practices contrary to this air carrier
regulation were rare (1 accident). In this single case, logged
access to official weather forecasts by the involved pilot was
evident indicating that the pilot was aware of the below
minimums weather at the destination prior to departure.

To the knowledge of the authors, this is the first study to
report that adherence to a subset of air carrier operational
rules (14CFR121) could augment safety (effecting a 20%
reduction in the IMC accident rate, the majority of which
have a fatal outcome) for IFR-rated private/commercial
pilots operating under the auspices of general aviation
regulations (14CFR91). The current study is noteworthy
considering that general aviation safety in IMC has shown
little improvement over the 15-year period spanning 2005–
2019.
The two air carrier regulations most frequently implicated in the current accident cohort merit more extensive
discussion: (a) nonadherence to departure and approach
(to land) weather minima per CFR121.651 and (b) high
minimum pilot-in-command (14CFR121.652) which mandates more conservative landing minima. Takeoffs and
landings are two of the most task-intensive phases of flight
and even more so when such operations are in IMC. For
example, for departures under instrument flight rules
(required for flying in IMC), a pilot commonly has to fly
an assigned heading at the same time as climbing the
aircraft, adjusting power settings and ‘‘cleaning up’’ the
airplane by way of retracting the landing gear (and in some
instances flaps). It is important to note that the aforementioned workload is added to immensely by the pilot having
to transition to instrument flying for takeoffs seamlessly
ignoring various vestibular illusions which may lead to
spatial disorientation (Partmet & Ercoline, 2008). Landing
an aircraft can be equally challenging in IMC as the pilot
has to sequence his/her attention from the flight instruments
(to maintain runway and glideslope alignment) to visual
conditions (to acquire the runway or runway environment)
and back to instruments in the absence of the latter. Clearly,
for a solo pilot, the lower the cloud ceiling or the shorter
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Table 1
Pilot demographics and flight histories for general aviation accidents in IMC.
Parameter
Instrument-Rated Pilot Certification

Private
Commercial

Crew Demographics

Age (years)
Male n (%)
Female n (%)

Flight History

All Aircraft Total Flight Time (h)
Make–model Total Time (h)
All Aircraft—Last 90 Days (h)
Total IMC time (h)
IMC Time—Last 90 Days (h)

Count (n)

Median

Q1

Q3

135
99

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

233
192 (97)
5 (3)

56
N/A
N/A

47
N/A
N/A

63
N/A
N/A

228
149
125
129
65

1,357
300
30
77
4

632
80
15
23
2

2,807
695
50
273
8

Note. Demographics, pilot certification, and flight histories are shown for the general aviation accident pilots. N/A, not applicable; IMC, actual instrument
meteorology flight time; h, hours; Q, quartile; n, count.

the forward flight visibility the more challenging this phase
of flight and even more so for a pilot with a limited time in
the make–model airplane. Consequently, general aviation
pilots would be well served by adhering to these two more
conservative air carrier regulations. This viewpoint is
reinforced by multiple reports citing deficient instrument
skills for general aviation pilots (Bennett & Schwirzke,
1992; Fanjoy & Keller, 2013; Shao et al., 2014) involved in
IMC (even more so at night) accidents.
Another consideration worth mentioning in the context
of exercising conservative practices for IMC operations is
the inaccuracy of aviation forecasting. Meteorology is an
inexact science and perhaps this is best illustrated by a
recent study of the accuracy of the terminal aerodrome
forecast (TAF) often relied on heavily by general aviation
pilots (Vasquez, 2018) undertaking relatively short flights
(e.g., for the proverbial ‘‘$100 hamburger’’). In that report,
TAF-based categorical forecasts (Federal Aviation Administration, 2018) for IFR conditions (cloud ceiling 500 to
,1,000 ft above ground) were 45% accurate, missing the
even more challenging low-IFR (ceiling ,500 ft above
ground) 55% of the time (Boyd & Guinn, 2021).
One issue which merits discussion is the preponderance
of departures/approaches below minimums per air carrier
regulations but perfectly permissible under the less
restrictive 14CFR91 regulations applicable to general
aviation (Electronic Code of Federal Regulation, 2015b).
Are such practices discussed during IFR student training?
The authors consider such a possibility less likely as
emphasis would be placed on regulations not to be breached
rather than nonexistent rules. On the other hand, considering
the findings herein this would well be a topic that deserves
more emphasis during recurrent training (e.g., flight reviews,
FAA-sponsored seminars) especially in the context of
aeronautical decision-making (Federal Aviation Administration, 2016).
Notwithstanding the benefits to safety that could be
achieved by adherence to the air carrier operational

regulations discussed herein, it is very unlikely that general
aviation could ever realize the stellar safety record witnessed for airlines for a plethora of reasons. For example,
a minimum of two flight crewmembers is mandatory
(Electronic Code of Federal Regulation, 2015c) per
14CFR121.385 for air carrier operations with the flying
and nonflying crew performing prescriptive and nonoverlapping duties (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014).
Moreover, air carrier regulations (14CFR121.395) specify
that the flight crew be in constant communication with an
aircraft dispatcher (Electronic Code of Federal Regulation,
2015c) for any flight. Such an individual partakes in the
preflight planning, monitors the progress of flights (under
his/her control), and issues relevant information for the safe
completion of the flight (14CFR121.533). This practice
differs from general aviation operations conducted by IFRrated pilots, the majority of which are conducted as singlepilot operations (Weislogel, 1983). Accordingly, the pilot
operating in IMC is responsible for tasks that, in an air
carrier environment, would be accomplished by three
separate individuals. Another marked difference between
general aviation and airlines which again likely contributes
to improved safety for the latter is much more rigorous
(often a multi-day program versus 2 hours) and more
frequent (at least yearly versus alternate years) recurrency
training/evaluations encapsulated in 14CFR121.427 and
14CFR61 respectively (Electronic Code of Federal Regulation, 2015c, 2018). Finally, a third reason underpinning
the improved air carrier safety is the redundancy of equipment mandatory for transport category aircraft certification
(Electronic Code of Federal Regulation, 2017b). At
variance with the aforementioned redundancy, certification
of light aircraft used in general aviation places little such
emphasis (Electronic Code of Federal Regulation, 2012).
The research was not without limitations. In all probability, several of the 14CFR121 categories analyzed herein
were under-represented. For example, since to the knowledge of the authors, TAFs are not archived, it was difficult,
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in this retrospective study, to determine (unless stated in the
NTSB report) if any of the accident flights departed under
conditions where the destination forecast indicated less
than the minimums approved for the accident aircraft. We
also suspect that fatigue may have been undercounted for
some IMC accidents since it was often unclear from the
NTSB report whether the accident pilot was working in a
professional capacity at his/her occupation (and the corresponding number of hours) prior to undertaking the accident
flight. Another shortcoming relates to incomplete flight
histories for IMC accidents, especially those which are
fatal—in such cases, pilot logbooks are frequently inaccessible/destroyed. For example, of 219 general aviation
accidents in IMC, pilot flight times for airplane make–
model were available for only 149. As a consequence, there
is a real possibility that the 14CFR121 regulations pertinent
to flight time (i.e., high minimum pilot-in-command, initial
operating experience, transition/difference training) may
have been undercounted.
Some of the aforementioned limitations could very well
be addressed in future research employing a prospective
(rather than a retrospective) methodology. For example, the
mandate effective January 2020 that general aviation aircraft operating in certain US airspace have to be Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)-Out equipped
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2021a) could allow
insight into the behaviors/decision-making of instrumentrated general aviation pilots in regard to operating in
degraded visibility.
In conclusion, towards improving flight safety in
degraded visibility, IFR-rated general aviation pilots should
be encouraged to align their operational practices with the
aforementioned air carrier regulations which, with little
doubt, have contributed to the stellar safety evident for the
latter. We encourage advocacy of such air carrier practices
via (a) pilot recurrency programs, e.g., flight reviews
(Electronic Code of Federal Regulation, 2018), (b) FAA
safety meetings, (c) national flight instructor organizations,
and (d) insurance carriers.
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